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Abstract 
We derive monthly and quarterly series of UK GDP for the inter-war period from a 
set of indicators that were constructed at the time. We proceed to illustrate how the 
new data can contribute to our understanding of the economic history of the UK in the 
1930s and have also used the series to draw comparisons between recession profiles in 
the 1930s and the post-war period. 
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Gross domestic product is generally regarded as the most appropriate indicator 
of economic activity. But for the interwar period the data are only available at the 
annual frequency. As such, many important questions cannot be addressed in a 
satisfactory manner. If we are interested in the impact of historical events, such as the 
effect of policy changes that take place at discrete points in time, we are limited to 
using either annual data1 or indicators of economic activity at a monthly or quarterly 
frequency that may not fully capture macroeconomic movements.  But to understand 
the economic impact of many important events it is necessary to have data available at 
a higher frequency that are reliable and consistent with the annual national accounts. 
In this article we describe a monthly index of GDP for the United Kingdom for the 
period 1924-1938 and we show that it, used in conjunction with other monthly 
indicators, clarifies our understanding of the major economic events of the period. 
The index can also be aggregated to the quarterly frequency, allowing researchers to 
more effectively discuss the interwar economy using data at the quarterly frequency. 
A considerable amount of work has been done on the development of monthly 
indicators of economic activity. Perhaps the best known is provided by the system of 
indicators developed by Burns and Mitchell (1946). Their work was anticipated by 
The Economist, which collected monthly indicators during the period 1924-1938 and 
published an aggregate indicator computed as the geometric mean of the indicators 
they collected2. The data set from The Economist forms the basis of the monthly GDP 
indicator that we present here, together with data for quarterly industrial production3. 
Averaging the indicator variables is not the only possible method of aggregation. 
Rhodes (1937) suggested instead that the first principal component of the series could 
be used. This amounts to identifying an aggregate which, on its own, accounts for as 
much as possible of the overall variation in the data set. Much more recently Stock 
and Watson (2002), while unaware of Rhodes work, have used the same approach to 
                                                 
1 The first set of consistent historical national accounts was provided by Feinstein (1972). 
Improvements to the interwar national accounts were made more recently by Sefton and Weale (1995) 
and Solomou and Weale (1996) who allocated the discrepancies between income and expenditure in 
Feinstein’s estimates so as to produce balanced national accounts for the period since 1920. 
2The monthly indicators and the component series were published regularly in The Economist ‘Trade 
Supplement’. The series was extended back to 1920 by the Economist, but the compilers recognised 
that the data were “much less reliable for the years before 1924” (Capie and Collins, 1983, p. 45).  
3 The indices covered coal consumption, electricity consumption, merchandise on railways, commercial 
motors in use, postal receipts, building activity, iron and steel for home consumption, raw cotton 
delivered to mills, imports of raw materials, exports British manufactures, shipping movements, bank 
clearings (metropolitan) and bank clearings (towns).  
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derive a monthly indicator of the US economy. While the first principal component 
may be a good summary of the data, it is not necessarily the aggregate that is most 
closely correlated with GDP. Some means is needed of selecting from the indicators a 
composite which is closely linked to GDP rather than one which is simply a summary 
of the indicator data set. In this paper we derive monthly GDP series using the latent 
indicator methodology outlined in the Appendix. We present the new data set and 
compare the high-frequency description of the British economy with other studies. 
We also illustrate two possible uses of the new data: first, we discuss how high 
frequency data improves our understanding of the end of the Great Depression in the 
British economy; secondly, we also use the data to compare the high frequency time-
profile of the depression of the 1930s with more recent recessions4.  
 
 
1. Statistical Methodology 
A statistical appendix details the econometric methodology used to construct 
our indicator of monthly GDP from the available annual GDP data, the quarterly 
industrial production data and the monthly indicator variables. When there are only a 
few monthly indicator variables available, regression methods could be used to 
construct the monthly GDP estimates. Mitchell et al. (2005) discuss the use of mixed-
frequency variables (such as a combination of monthly and quarterly or annual 
variables) in regression equations and go on to show how such equations can be used 
to produce monthly estimates of GDP. But the fact that we have a reasonably large 
number of monthly indicator variables, from The Economist, makes it difficult to use 
their methods satisfactorily since the regression would run into degree-of-freedom 
constraints. An alternative, described in the Appendix, is to assume that the indicators, 
industrial production and GDP are driven, at the monthly frequency, by an underlying 
unobserved or latent variable. Estimates of this unobserved variable can then be used 
to provide a monthly indicator of GDP and the resulting monthly estimates can be 
                                                 
4 Our focus in this work is on periods of economic weakness; we compare the 1930s with more recent 
experience. In our discussion we use the term recession to mean a period when output is falling (i.e. the 
economy is receding) and depression to mean a period when output is below some reference value such 
as the peak reached before a recession started. Thus the terms do not convey anything about the 
severity of the different episodes. A depression lasts longer than a recession simply because once 
output starts rising after a recession it inevitably takes some time to surpass its previous peak. Our 
emphasis, then, is on depressions thus defined.  
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adjusted, so that the monthly totals sum to the estimates of annual GDP, making the 
monthly estimates consistent with the annual national accounts. On a technical level, 
an additional advantage of the method set out in the Appendix is that it provides an 
exact solution to the problem that when modelling the logarithm of GDP, as is 
preferable to modelling the level of GDP, the sum of the interpolated monthly values 
nevertheless equals the known annual total. 
In the absence of monthly economic data, which while not measures of GDP 
itself are believed to provide some clue about monthly movements in GDP, the best 
that can be done is to interpolate the annual GDP data using a univariate (dynamic) 
model. This is clearly not ideal, as important but offsetting intra-year movements in 
GDP will be missed, since the statistical model assumed to govern the determination 
of monthly GDP can at best be fitted to the available annual GDP data.  
Fortunately, as discussed above, a range of relevant monthly indicator series, 
drawn from The Economist and used by Rhodes (1937), is available for the UK over 
the 1924-1938 period. Together with the quarterly industrial production series (Capie 
and Collins, 1983) these data provide an indication of monthly/quarterly movements 
in economic activity. However, they do not measure GDP itself and at best can be 
viewed as providing an incomplete picture. For these monthly/quarterly data to be 
used to draw inferences about the state of the economy as a whole it is desirable that 
there should be some formal statistical procedure for exploiting them and arriving at 
an indicator of monthly GDP. Such a procedure is likely to produce estimates of GDP 
which are less satisfactory than those which might have been produced by direct 
measurement but is preferable simply to “eye-balling” or averaging the indicator 
series and drawing subjective conclusions about the likely behaviour of monthly GDP 
in the absence of any statistical knowledge of how these series might relate to GDP. 
As Rhodes (1937, p. 18) notes it is necessary to “reduce this mass of data… to a more 
digestible form”. Somewhat differently, as we explain in the statistical appendix, from 
Rhodes’ own objective (which has also been shared by a recent econometric literature 
spurred by Stock and Watson, 1991) we seek to reduce the monthly/quarterly data to 
an estimator of monthly GDP itself. Importantly, in contrast to this literature, this 
means we also consider annual GDP data and therefore adopt a mixed-frequency 
approach to deriving monthly estimates of GDP. 
Following Stone (1947) and Stock and Watson (1991) our dynamic factor-
based methodology assumes that a latent variable or “factor”, taken to represent the 
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“business cycle”, drives variations and co-movements in the observed monthly, 
quarterly and annual data. Importantly, this assumption is consistent with Burns and 
Mitchell’s (1946) characterisation of the “business cycle” as common movements in 
different economic indicators. Booms and recessions are marked, respectively, not 
just by one but by a range of economic indicators rising and falling.  
In our approach each of the observed variables (the monthly indicators, 
industrial production and GDP itself) is then assumed to deviate from this common 
factor by an idiosyncratic component, specific to each series. These idiosyncratic 
components are allowed to follow distinct dynamic processes. This flexibility means 
that the model provides a good fit to the data. 
The “business cycle” is also allowed to have a differential effect on the 
different variables. It is found, for example, that all of the monthly indicator variables 
in The Economist, as well as industrial production and GDP, are “coincident 
indicators”, in the sense that they rise and fall with the “business cycle”. But the 
“business cycle” has a particularly strong effect, as we might expect, on GDP itself; 
although it is again important to allow for idiosyncratic dynamics to capture the noise 
evident in monthly GDP movements. In other words, while the “business cycle” 
captures the general tendency for GDP to rise and fall, it remains important, in order 
to achieve a good fit of the data, to model also the higher-frequency noise specific to 
monthly GDP movements. 
 
2. Monthly and Quarterly GDP Series 
 
We present data at both market prices and factor cost, but focus our attention 
on the market price data. In the Appendix we provide details of the data and the 
parameter estimates used when estimating market price data. Similar results for the 
estimation of GDP at factor cost are available on request.  
Table 1 and Figure 1 present the new monthly GDP series for the inter-war 
period.  The main contribution of the new data is in the macroeconomic description of 
the high-frequency path of the economy. A number of important features stand out: 
first, the return to gold in 1925 is correlated with a downturn in the months of April-
July 1925; secondly, the weakness of the economy in 1928, highlighted in Solomou 
and Weale (1996), stands out in the high frequency data but is limited to the months 
of March-June.  
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Conventionally, the peak of the UK economy in 1929 is dated as July 1929 
and the third quarter of 1929 (Burns and Mitchell, 1946). The new data show the peak 
as being January 1930 (with another local peak in October 1929). The dating of the 
recovery is also different from that reported in Burns and Mitchell (1946). On a 
monthly basis they date the trough as August 1932 and, on a quarterly basis, as third 
quarter 1932. Although our data also suggests that the trough is best dated as August 
1932, the recovery tapered away in the first five months of 1933, suggesting that a 
clear path to recovery is not established around one local turning point – in fact a 
sustained recovery is not clear until well into 1933. The turning points of the 1937-8 
recession are also different from those outlined in Burns and Mitchell who date the 
peak as September 1937. The new data suggest that GDP continued to expand until 
January 1938. Such differences may seem minor in that the order of magnitude is a 
few months but they can have substantial implications for particular questions. For 
example, if we wish to address the role of particular policies in generating recovery 
from the Great Depression, a few months can have significant implications for the 
analysis of the transmission mechanism by which policies may have had an impact.  
The new data can also be aggregated to generate quarterly estimates of GDP. 
The quarterly data are presented in Table 2 and Figure 2. To help the reader evaluate 
our data series we also compare both our series with the quarterly estimates of 
interwar GDP at factor cost reported in Hayes and Turner (2007). All three sets of 
data are presented as indices with the average for 1924-1938 set to 100.
Figure 1: Monthly GDP at 1938 Market Prices and Factor Cost 
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Table 1a: 1924-38 Monthly GDP at Market Prices, £mn 1938 prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b: 1924-1938 Monthly GDP Data at Factor Cost, £mn 1938 prices 
 
  
Jan 
 
Feb 
 
Mar 
 
Apr 
 
May 
 
Jun 
 
July 
 
Aug 
 
Sep 
 
Oct 
 
Nov 
 
Dec 
 
1924 338.96 339.37 339.69 341.44 345.32 344.38 347.28 346.86 348.43 350.44 352.97 353.86
1925 356.35 357.61 357.76 358.04 355.09 355.96 355.45 355.16 357.16 359.19 362.70 364.53
1926 365.70 367.23 366.07 367.65 334.98 325.33 322.77 334.08 338.58 338.12 342.96 357.53
1927 369.92 372.60 373.57 374.10 373.60 372.76 372.11 373.04 373.99 375.50 375.00 374.82
1928 375.24 377.95 377.06 378.01 376.21 374.01 373.18 374.39 375.87 377.92 379.08 382.09
1929 383.89 382.45 385.36 386.26 384.43 386.64 386.28 388.58 389.72 391.03 393.16 392.20
1930 393.70 393.55 391.19 387.98 386.72 384.87 381.56 380.40 380.00 379.12 378.20 375.70
1931 371.12 370.76 368.88 365.15 365.39 363.06 363.41 363.41 362.35 365.59 369.93 369.95
1932 368.80 371.99 368.94 365.46 364.56 364.67 364.27 362.22 362.61 367.08 368.03 373.37
1933 372.34 373.26 372.86 374.71 372.46 376.31 377.06 378.85 381.86 383.64 387.03 391.61
1934 395.20 397.25 398.01 398.58 399.31 399.75 399.85 401.06 402.03 404.61 407.06 410.30
1935 409.40 409.25 410.23 411.17 413.25 414.73 414.53 416.11 418.01 420.93 424.67 428.74
1936 429.02 430.23 431.14 433.28 433.30 434.87 435.91 438.43 438.27 439.75 441.50 443.30
1937 443.27 445.74 447.41 446.97 449.83 450.31 449.79 452.76 453.71 456.02 457.81 458.37
1938 460.96 459.77 456.79 452.75 450.28 449.50 449.26 450.51 453.24 457.30 457.30 456.35
  
Jan 
 
Feb 
 
Mar 
 
Apr 
 
May 
 
Jun 
 
July 
 
Aug 
 
Sep 
 
Oct 
 
Nov 
 
Dec 
 
 
1924 300.51 300.75 300.91 302.46 306.10 305.02 307.70 307.16 308.56 310.41 312.79 313.63
1925 316.08 317.30 317.42 317.66 314.76 315.59 315.09 314.82 316.82 318.86 322.37 324.24
1926 325.46 327.06 326.01 327.65 295.80 286.48 284.04 295.03 299.40 298.90 303.54 317.64
1927 329.60 332.07 332.86 333.24 332.62 331.68 330.93 331.74 332.58 333.98 333.45 333.25
1928 333.67 336.33 335.45 336.36 334.58 332.41 331.58 332.76 334.20 336.19 337.29 340.19
1929 341.88 340.40 343.18 344.00 342.12 344.20 343.74 345.91 346.93 348.15 350.21 349.29
1930 350.87 350.78 348.49 345.34 344.13 342.33 339.12 338.03 337.68 336.85 335.95 333.44
1931 328.85 328.47 326.68 323.14 323.49 321.36 321.84 321.99 321.09 324.38 328.77 328.94
1932 328.00 331.26 328.36 325.01 324.16 324.29 323.90 321.90 322.28 326.63 327.52 332.69
1933 331.58 332.40 331.92 333.66 331.36 335.03 335.65 337.28 340.10 341.72 344.94 349.36
1934 352.85 354.79 355.43 355.86 356.44 356.74 356.72 357.78 358.63 361.05 363.34 366.38
1935 365.33 365.04 365.89 366.72 368.69 370.05 369.76 371.22 372.98 375.74 379.32 383.25
1936 383.47 384.57 385.36 387.34 387.22 388.63 389.52 391.87 391.58 392.90 394.47 396.07
1937 395.85 398.11 399.63 399.09 401.82 402.22 401.63 404.49 405.36 407.59 409.32 409.87
1938 412.44 411.26 408.26 404.21 401.68 400.80 400.44 401.53 404.08 407.91 407.75 406.64
 9
 
Hayes and Turner used the Chow-Lin (1971) method to interpolate GDP 
estimates based on Quarterly Industrial Production as an indicator variable.  They 
used a linear model rather than one specified in logarithms. Our methodology is an 
improvement on the Chow-Lin method and our use of a richer set of indicator 
variables suggests that our data offer a more accurate depiction of the macroeconomic 
path of the economy. The reliance on a single volatile series, such as industrial 
production, to derive quarterly data for GDP explains why the Hayes-Turner Series is 
more volatile than our series. While we have no independent means of verification, 
our method could in principle produce a series very similar to theirs if that were the 
most appropriate interpretation of the inter-relationships in the combined set of data. 
The fact that it did not is a reason for preferring our more stable series to theirs. As 
can be seen from Figure 2, apart from the matter of volatility in the Hayes-Turner 
series there are important turning point differences in 1929, 1931 and 1937-8.  In 
using a richer set of indicators we get a better description of macroeconomic turning 
points.  
Our market price and factor cost series are scarcely distinguishable when 
represented in this way; this does obscure some movements which may be of interest. 
For example, measured relative to the fourth quarter of 1929, our estimate of GDP at 
factor cost shows a decline of 7.9 per cent by the third quarter of 1931, while the 
measure at market prices shows a decline of only 7.4 per cent. The Hayes-Turner 
measure shows a decline of 5.7 per cent and puts the trough of the depression in the 
first quarter of 1931 with output 6.4 per cent below the figure for the fourth quarter of 
1931.  It should be noted that these differences arise not only because of the 
differences in interpolation methodology, but also because we used the annual 
balanced GDP estimates provided by Sefton and Weale (1995) while Hayes and 
Turner used Feinstein’s (1972) data.  
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Figure 2: Indicators of Quarterly GDP at 1938 prices
Table 2a:  1924-38 Quarterly GDP at Market Prices, £mn 1938 prices 
 
  
Q1 
 
Q2 
 
Q3 
 
Q4 
 
1924 1018.02 1031.14 1042.57 1057.27
1925 1071.72 1069.09 1067.77 1086.42
1926 1099.00 1027.96 995.43 1038.61
1927 1116.09 1120.46 1119.14 1125.32
1928 1130.25 1128.23 1123.44 1139.09
1929 1151.70 1157.33 1164.58 1176.39
1930 1178.44 1159.57 1141.96 1133.02
1931 1110.76 1093.60 1089.17 1105.47
1932 1109.73 1094.69 1089.10 1108.48
1933 1118.46 1123.48 1137.77 1162.28
1934 1190.46 1197.64 1202.94 1221.97
1935 1228.88 1239.15 1248.65 1274.34
1936 1290.39 1301.45 1312.61 1324.55
1937 1336.42 1347.11 1356.26 1372.20
1938 1377.52 1352.53 1353.01 1370.95
 
 
 
 
Table 2b:  1924-38 Quarterly GDP at Factor Cost, £mn 1938 prices 
 
  
Q1 
 
Q2 
 
Q3 
 
Q4 
 
1924 902.17 913.58 923.42 936.83
1925 950.80 948.01 946.73 965.47
1926 978.53 909.93 878.47 920.08
1927 994.53 997.54 995.25 1000.68
1928 1005.45 1003.35 998.54 1013.67
1929 1025.46 1030.32 1036.58 1047.65
1930 1050.14 1031.80 1014.83 1006.24
1931 984.00 967.99 964.92 982.09
1932 987.62 973.46 968.08 986.84
1933 995.90 1000.05 1013.03 1036.02
1934 1063.07 1069.04 1073.13 1090.77
1935 1096.26 1105.46 1113.96 1138.31
1936 1153.40 1163.19 1172.97 1183.44
1937 1193.59 1203.13 1211.48 1226.78
1938 1231.96 1206.69 1206.05 1222.30
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3.1 Historical Applications of the New Data 
In this section we illustrate two uses of the new data: first we apply the high 
frequency information on the economy to address the question of how the British 
economy came out of the Great Depression in the 1930s, in particular, is there 
evidence of expectation effects arising from the policies pursued in 1931-2; secondly, 
we compare the high-frequency time-profile of depression and recovery in the Great 
Depression of the 1930s with more recent post-war recessions. 
Temin (1989) draws on Sargent (1983) to emphasise the importance of 
expectation changes as part of an underlying policy regime change to help economies 
out of the Great Depression.  Temin argues that although Britain devalued in 
September 1931 the continuation of the policy framework of balanced budgets and 
restrictive monetary policy prevented an effective recovery in Britain during the 
1930s. This contrasts with the experience of the USA –when Roosevelt succeeded 
President Hoover in March 1933 and announced the devaluation of the dollar, this 
was perceived as a powerful policy regime change that ended the depression in the 
USA. Similarly, Temin argues that Hitler’s policy announcements in early 1933 
represented a change big enough to shift expectations and end the depression in 
Germany. Temin is aware that to evaluate how policy regime change ended the Great 
depression we need good quality high frequency data and provided some high 
frequency analysis of the recovery profiles in the USA and Germany. However, he did 
not provide the high-frequency data needed to analyse the British case. The new 
monthly GDP data allow us to evaluate the consistency of some of the ideas of the 
policy regime literature. 
 Figure 1 and Table 1 show that the devaluation in September 1931 was 
correlated with a significant recovery, suggesting that expectation effects may have 
had an impact, since it is unlikely that trade volumes responded immediately, but it is 
quite clear that the recovery came to an abrupt end with another downturn in early 
1932, suggesting a limited policy regime change. Devaluation in September 1931 was 
followed by monetary easing with “cheap money” in April 1932 and the General tariff 
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in February 19325. However, neither of these policies seems to have generated 
immediate observable effects on the path of recovery with the economy continuing to 
slide between February and August 1932. Clearly, Temin’s hypothesis of an absence 
of observable recovery in 1931-2 is consistent with the new high-frequency data. The 
policy moves in the British economy during 1931-2 did not generate immediate 
expectation effects that were powerful enough to end the depression. However, 
beginning in September 1932 and after a relapse in early 1933, again in June 1933 the 
economy moved along a path of persistent and strong recovery, suggesting that 
Britain was able to recover effectively during the 1930s.  
Temin’s evaluation of the UK experience draws on the rational expectations 
policy framework. However, the early rational expectations models are recognised to 
be based on strong and unrealistic assumptions. Bray and Savin (1986) and Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001) suggest that the learning path of expectations may be important. 
The early rational expectations models assumed perfect information on the part of 
economic agents together with the assumption of a unique model and knowledge of its 
parameters. This is of course unrealistic, and an adaptive learning approach is 
proposed, where agents have to take time to gather information and learn about 
parameters in the same way as an econometrician. This is a specific form of bounded 
rationality and the forecast rule of agents is adjusted over time with the emergence of 
new data. If adaptive learning is assumed, then expectations may converge to the fully 
‘rational expectations’ equilibrium eventually, but may not jump to such an 
equilibrium immediately. The evidence from the British high frequency data may be 
consistent with the idea that it took time to learn that the equilibrium expectations had 
changed. No single event determined this but along a bumpy path between September 
1931 and early 1933 the economy made a transition to a path of sustained recovery.  
Such hesitant recovery paths have been observed more widely in the 
experience of the early 1930s. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) report that on average 
there was hesitation between devaluation in the early 1930s and monetary expansion6. 
What does the British experience tell us about the role of policy regime change and 
the end of the great depression more generally? Clearly the British Government found 
it difficult to generate a favourable expectation effect on the recovery path 
                                                 
5 The Import Duties Act was introduced by Neville Chamberlain in February 1932 and came into 
operation on 1 March 1932. 
6 Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) report that the mean lag between devaluation and monetary expansion 
was around 2 years in the early 1930s. 
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instantaneously with any single policy move – be it devaluation, tariffs or monetary 
expansion. However, there are a series of policy reactions that may have contributed 
to a persistent and strong recovery from early 1933. This suggests that it was not 
simple to generate a switching of an economy with one policy move. We contend that 
the picture of the UK can be generalised to other countries responding to the Great 
Depression with devaluation in 1931– an adaptive learning process may turn out to be 
a more general perspective for analysing policy effects on expectations7. To address 
the broader issue that arises from the British case study would require researchers to 
build a high frequency cross-country data set of the profile of depression and recovery 
in the 1930s. 
 
 
3.2 Depression Profiles of the 1930s and Post-war 
 
In this section we use the new data to compare the time-profile of depression 
of the 1930s with the three complete recessions of the post-war years and also with 
the current recession. The figures for the post-war years are calculated from the 
monthly GDP figures produced regularly by the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research. These are computed monthly, making use of key monthly data 
(industrial production and retail sales) which are not available for the 1930s, and are 
always aligned against the latest quarterly official GDP data. While revisions to the 
official quarterly data can affect all the monthly estimates, obviously the data for the 
most recent recession are the most subject to change.  All figures relate to GDP at 
market prices but the volume indices for the post-war years are aligned to chain-
linked quarterly figures while the volume figures for the 1930s are linked to balanced 
Laspeyres measures. 
The timing of the depressions is shown in Table 3. The start of each 
depression is the month in which GDP reached a peak and the last month is the month 
in which GDP was below this peak for the last time. It should be noted that this timing 
is sensitive to the end points being defined by the peak month rather than by, say, the 
peak of a centred three-month rolling average. Using the latter definition we would 
find, for example, that the current depression began in March 2008; even our choice 
                                                 
7 The German case can also be incorporated into this perspective. Temin argues that the German 
recovery was delayed until the policy regime change of 1933. The German high frequency data 
suggests that recovery is built over a longer phase between 1932 and 1933 (Ritschl, 2002). 
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of April may seem arbitrary. Working to the two decimal places our interpolands 
make possible, output seems to have been very slightly lower in April than in 
February. But to one decimal place the output levels are the same and on these 
grounds we have placed the start in April.  Similarly the date of emergence is 
sensitive to the definition; we have chosen the month after the last month in which 
output was depressed below the previous peak. 
 
 
Table 3: The Timing of Recent Depressions 
First Month Last Month 
                      January 1930                        December 1933 
                      June 1973                        August 1976 
                      June 1979                        June 1983 
                      March 1990                        March 1993 
                      April 2008  
  
 
In Figure 3, in order to suppress short-term noise we measure the change in 
GDP relative to the three-month average centred on the peak month. It can be seen 
that this has a substantial effect on the way in which the data for the 1979-1983 
depression appear. GDP in June 1979 was 1½% higher than the average for the period 
May to July 1979 and this is shown in the positive displacement at the start of the 
depression. Had we instead measured the depression relative to GDP in the peak 
month the curve for 1979 to 1983 would have been shifted sharply down and the 
depression would then have appeared much more like the 1930s depression in its 
depth as well as its duration. The position of the other curves is not substantially 
affected by this treatment; as can be seen, the displacement at the start of the 
depression is small in the other four cases.  
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Figure 3: The Profiles of Five UK Depressions.  
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51
G
D
P 
V
ol
um
e 
M
ea
su
re
: C
ha
ng
e 
fr
om
 P
ea
k
1930-33 1973-76 1979-83 1990-93 2008-  
 
In Figure 3 we note that a number of depression-recovery profiles are observed even 
for this small historical selection of British depressions. A W-shaped depression- 
recovery profile is observed in the 1930s and the 1970s; the depression of the 1980s 
contains elements of V and W-shaped profiles; the depression of the 1990s is U-
shaped. Explaining the determinants of these different profiles requires a more 
detailed discussion of each event. 
 
In terms of profile the 1973-1976 depression appears to show the same sort of 
double dip to that of the 1930s. However, the factors behind this were quite different. 
The start of the depression is dated to May 1973. In the winter of 1973-4 oil supplies 
were disrupted by the OPEC embargo and there was a coal miners’ strike which led to 
a three-day working week and widespread power cuts. While the depression started 
before these events, they were responsible for the sharp fall in output in the nine 
months of the recession. There then followed a recovery with a second dip which 
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began late in 1974; it is worth noting that this second dip began as the stock market 
was close to the low point of the 1973-75 crash which is the sharpest collapse 
recorded on the UK stock market. The low point of the depression in the summer of 
1975 followed the remarkable stock market recovery of January to March 1975 when 
the market, as measured by the Financial Times 30-share Index, more than doubled in 
the space of six weeks.  But the depression as a whole was relatively short-lived with 
output surpassing its pre-depression level thirty-nine months after the start of the 
depression.  
The depression which began in June 1979 also shows a steep fall followed by 
a sharp recovery and then a sustained downward move. The high level of demand in 
the second quarter of 1979 and particularly in June 1979 is generally regarded as 
anomalous by econometricians and there is no clear explanation of it although it may 
have been a result of pent-up demand after the combination of a series of strikes in the 
winter of 1978-79 and severe winter weather. After a fall in output in the summer of 
1979 there was a recovery by the autumn. But the economy was now affected by the 
government’s policy of high interest rates, with the Minimum Lending Rate set to 
17% p.a. in November 1979 in order to bring down the inflation rate; possibly as a 
consequence of this policy of tight money, the exchange rate rose to a high level. This 
combination seems to have had a fairly sudden effect on output with the contraction 
continuing until April 1981 although the interest rate was reduced to 16% p.a. in July 
1980 and 14% p.a. in November 1980 as the intensity of the squeeze became 
apparent. The exchange rate itself reached a peak8 of 22% above its May 1979 value 
in February 1981 and then began to fall back, returning to its May 1979 value in 
January 1983 five months before output regained its 1979 peak. The expansionary 
influence of this more than dominated the contractionary effect of the March 1981 
Budget and explains why, after the spring of 1981, the economy began to recover.  
Both the 1973-1976 and the 1979-1983 depressions are described by Dow 
(1998) as OPEC recessions in that they both followed sharp increases in oil prices 
which were themselves associated with oil embargoes. In the first case the oil 
embargo followed the war between Israel and Egypt of November 1973.9 In the 
second case it followed the revolution in Iran. But there was an important distinction 
                                                 
8 Measured by the IMF effective exchange rate index available from the Bank of England as series 
XUMAGBG. 
9 There had been an earlier embargo associated with Egypt’s attack on Israel in 1967 but that was 
largely ineffective, probably because the United States was then the world’s largest oil exporter.  
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between the two in that in the second recession policy-makers in Britain had the clear 
aim of using monetary policy to bring the rate of inflation down while during the first 
recession much greater reliance was placed on incomes policies and negotiation with 
trades unions.  
The 1990 recession was the shortest of the complete post-war recessions; 
output surpassed its previous peak after thirty-seven months. Like the 1979 depression 
it was induced by tight monetary policy as a response to a high rate of inflation which 
followed on from the expansionary policies of the late 1980s. It was also, like the 
earlier depressions international in its spread.  We date the trough of the depression to 
April 1992 suggesting that a very weak recovery was underway before the sterling 
devaluation associated with the end of ERM membership in September 1992. 
However, most economists would attribute an important role to this in sustaining the 
recovery.  
The early period of the current depression suggests that what was initially a 
relatively mild contraction became much steeper from September 2008 onwards, with 
output falling by four percentage points between then and March 2009. This sharp 
contraction is widely linked to the financial crisis which followed the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers on 16th September 2008. The period was associated with a steep 
contraction of international trade and marked de-stocking. This phase, in which output 
fell more steeply than in the 1930s depression, came to an end in the spring of 2009 
and the current situation seems to be that output has become more stable but that there 
is no clear recovery underway in the Summer of 2009.   
 
 
Conclusions 
The strongest message from our analysis is that rather than use disparate 
indicators in an ad hoc manner to draw conclusions about the profiles of business 
cycles, it is preferable to use these variables to construct high-frequency estimates of 
GDP. There are two reasons for this. First of all, with no formal mechanism for 
aggregating disparate indicators it is not clear how judgement should be deployed in 
deciding how much importance to allocate to each; however if a formal mechanism 
for aggregation is used and it results in an indicator not directly related to GDP, the 
outcome can be only confusion. Secondly, if the indicator is not directly related to 
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GDP it is not clear how to relate the monthly signals it provides to that offered in 
standard GDP data.  
Tools exist to interpolate GDP and we have shown here that, drawing on 
contemporaneously-collected monthly data, they can be used to produce monthly 
estimates of GDP for the UK for the period 1924-1938. The resulting series allows us 
to draw conclusions about the effects of key policy changes in the period which differ 
somewhat from those reached earlier without recourse to interpolated GDP figures. It 
also enables us to make a comparison between the depression of the 1930s and more 
recent depressions in the UK. 
The high frequency GDP data provided here will be of use to economists and 
economic historians addressing a number of questions. The global financial crisis of 
2008 has resulted in renewed interest in the homologies between the current events 
and the Great depression. This has resulted in the need for high frequency data 
covering both periods. To date the literature has been forced to use series for 
industrial production because they are available for both periods on a high frequency 
basis (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009). However, in light of significant de-
industrialisation over the post-war period, such comparisons can be very misleading 
when making macroeconomic comparisons. The monthly GDP series provided here 
allow for more relevant macroeconomic comparisons. 
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APPENDIX: THE TEMPORAL DISAGGREGATION METHOD AND A SUMMARY OF THE 
RESULTS 
 
 
This appendix details the econometric methodology used to construct our indicator of 
monthly GDP from the available annual GDP data. The annual GDP data used (from 
1924-1938) are the balanced constant price series at market values and taken from 
Sefton and Weale (1995, Table A.3, pp.188-189). The exercise, to ensure that the 
monthly GDP estimates over a calendar year sum to these annual data, is one of 
interpolation or, more precisely, distribution and has been considered, amongst others, 
by Chow and Lin (1971), Harvey and Pierse (1984) and Mitchell et al. (2005).  
 
The approach taken here is to assume that a latent variable or “factor”, taken to 
represent the “business cycle”, drives variations and co-movements in the observed 
monthly, quarterly and annual data. A (dynamic) factor-based approach provides a 
parsimonious means of characterising fluctuations in a reasonably large number of 
variables. It avoids degrees-of-freedom constraints which a regression-based 
approach, that used all the indicator variables, would confront. 
 
 
A1. Interpolating monthly GDP using a dynamic factor model  
 
The particular model employed is based on Proietti and Moauro (2006). Their model 
has the attraction of letting us work in the log-levels of the variables, rather than their 
growth rates as in Stock and Watson (1991) and can handle mixed frequency data.  
 
Consider the N-vector of monthly time-series ,t my , where the subscript t denotes the 
particular year, q the quarter within that year and m the month within that year, 
m=1,…,12; q=1,2,3,4 and t=1,…,T. It is assumed that ,t my , perhaps after a logarithmic 
transformation, is a linear combination of a (scalar) common factor ,t mμ , which 
represents the “business cycle”, and an idiosyncratic N-vector component *,t mμ . The 
business cycle’s effect on each of the N time-series in ,t my  can differ and is 
determined by the N-vector of factor loadings,θ . The model can be represented as: 
 21
 
*
, , ,
2
, , ,
* * *
, , ,
,  1,..., ;  1,...,12
( ) ,  (0, )
( ) ,  ( , )
t m t m t m
t m t m t m
t m t m t m
t T m
L NID
L NID
η
μ
φ μ η η σ
⎫= + = = ⎪⎪Δ = ∼ ⎬⎪Δ = + ∼ ⎪⎭*η
y θ μ
D μ β η η 0 Σ
         (1) 
 
where 1( ) 1 ...
p
pL L Lφ φ φ= − − −  is an autoregressive polynomial of order p with 
stationary roots and the matrix polynomial ( )LD  is diagonal with elements equal to 
1( ) 1 ... ii
p
i i ipd L d L d L= − − − , 2 21( ,..., )Ndiag σ σ=*ηΣ  and the disturbances ,t mη  and *,t mη  
are independently distributed.  
 
Model (1) implies that each individual time-series ,it myΔ  (i=1,…,N), expressed as a 
first difference, is composed of a mean (drift) term iβ , an individual autoregressive 
(AR) process 1 *,( )i it md L η−  as well as the business cycle (common) AR component 
1
,( ) t mLφ η− . Following Stock and Watson (1991), we achieve identification by 
setting 2 1ησ =  and assuming a zero drift in the equation for ,t mμΔ . Model (1) is 
flexible. It can accommodate elements of ,t my  being I(1); both the common trend ,t mμ  
and the idiosyncratic components *,t mμ  are modelled as difference stationary 
processes.  Proietti and Moauro (2006) explain how this model can be cast in state-
space form, which is the precursor to estimation of the model by maximum likelihood 
using the Kalman filter. 
 
However, while the model (1) governing the determination of ,t my is considered at the 
monthly frequency, actual observations for some of the N variables might not be 
available each month. In particular, we partition ,t my  into , 1 , 2 , 3 ,( ' , , ) 't m t m t m t my y=y y  
where 1 ,t my  represents the observed monthly indicators from The Economist 
(considered further below) and 2 ,t my and 3 ,t my  represent monthly industrial production 
and GDP, respectively, which, of course, are latent and the objects we wish to 
estimate.  
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Fortunately, we do observe annual GDP data 3ty , such that 
12
3 3 ,1t t mm
y y== ∑          (2) 
 
Similarly, we observe quarterly industrial production data 2qy , such thatimport 
*3
2 2 ,( 1)*3 1
;  1,..., 4.m qq t mm qy y q
=
= − += =∑       (3) 
 
Harvey and Pierse (1984) first explained how a model like (1), when cast in state-
space form, can be estimated subject to (flow) aggregation constraints like (2) and (3) 
and knowledge only of the annual GDP data, 3ty , and/or the quarterly industrial 
production data, 2qy . This is achieved by augmenting the state-space representation of 
model (1) with a so-called cumulator variable that ensures (2) or (3) is satisfied. The 
Kalman smoother is then used to compute the minimum mean squared error estimates 
for the missing observations 2 ,t my  and 3 ,t my . 
 
As Mitchell et al. (2005) explain the state-space approach to interpolation can be seen 
as asymptotically equivalent to regression-based methods. First developed by Chow 
and Lin (1971), and generalised to a dynamic non-stationary setting by Mitchell et al. 
(2005), these methods first aggregate the latent monthly model, which relates monthly 
GDP to the observed monthly indicators, so as to obtain an estimable equation in the 
observed annual data. Estimates of the unobserved monthly interpolands may then be 
produced by means of the latent monthly regression equation, and estimated 
coefficients based on the annual model, using data on the observable monthly 
indicators  
 
When ,t my  represents the logarithms of the original time-series the temporal 
aggregation constraint, seen previously in (2) and (3), is nonlinear: the sum of the 
logarithms is not the logarithm of the sum. We follow Proietti and Moauro (2006) and 
use their iterative algorithm to ensure the nonlinear aggregation constraint is met 
exactly given we model the data considered below in logarithms. 
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Estimation subject to the two aggregation constraints, (2) and (3), is facilitated by 
adopting a recursive structure whereby industrial production, as a component of GDP, 
affects GDP, but GDP does not affect industrial production. This means we first 
estimate 2 ,t my  as a function of 1 ,t my  subject to (3), and obtain consistent 
estimates 2 ,ˆ t my , and then estimate 3 ,t my  as a function of 1 ,t my and 2 ,ˆ t my , subject to (2).  
 
 
A2. The Data and Empirical Results  
 
The Economist newspaper contains 15 index numbers from 1924m1-1938m12 
pertaining to economic activity: employment, coal consumption, electricity 
consumption, railways, commercial motors in use, postal receipts, building activity, 
iron and steel for home consumption, raw cotton delivered to mills, imports: raw 
materials, exports of British manufactures, shipping movements, bank clearings 
(metropolitan), banking clearings (town) and what is called the “Aggregate Index”.  
 
The Aggregate Index, as discussed and evaluated by Rhodes (1937), in fact is itself a 
composite indicator designed to measure “some abstraction called Economic or 
Business Activity” (Rhodes, p. 18). It is a geometric average of the other 14 index 
numbers, with the weights chosen subjectively to reflect the relative importance of the 
constituent series. Rhodes (1937) set out an alternative statistical means of 
determining the weights and deriving an index of business activity. Our exercise, as 
indicated, is somewhat different from Rhodes’ and later the one undertaken by Stock 
and Watson (1991), and others. Rather than focus on the estimated latent variable 
which captures the “business cycle”, i.e., ,t mμ  in model (1), we consider the estimates 
of monthly GDP itself. This has the attraction precisely of not being a latent variable, 
so that its meaning is clear to all.  
 
Plotting the 15 series from The Economist in Figure A1 we see the clear effect of the 
General Strike in 1926. Coal production abruptly ceased in May-June 1926 and did 
not recover until the following year. The General Strike also had a similar effect on 
Iron and Steel for Home Consumption, with the whole economy clearly affected to 
some extent also. It is also of note that the data for Electricity were not available each 
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month until 1927. Prior to this they are available at the quarterly frequency only. 
These missing observations are handled, as indicated, by the Kalman filter. What are 
effectively outliers, due to the General Strike in 1926, are also tackled by setting the 
affected observations to missing values and letting the Kalman filter and smoother fill 
in the observations instead. Specifically, we set coal production to a missing value 
from 1926m5-1926m11 and set the 1925m5 value to a missing value for several other 
indicator variables. We note that similar results for the post 1927 period are in fact 
obtained if we commence estimation of model (1) in 1928. 
 
 
Figure A1: The Economist’s monthly data 
 
 
Assuming AR(1) processes (p=1 and pi=1) for the lag polynomials in model (1), the 
unknown parameters were then estimated by maximum likelihood exploiting the 
Kalman filter. The maximised value of the log-likelihood function, for the model 
explaining , 1 , 2 , 3 ,( ' , , ) 't m t m t m t my y=y y , was 5343.14. The parameter estimates, and their 
asymptotic t-values, are presented in Table A1. The estimated factor loadings are all 
positive and are mostly significantly different from zero (at a 99% level). The sign of 
the estimated factor loadings is consistent with the view that all of The Economist’s 
series are coincident indicators of economic activity. The t-values on the factor 
 25
loadings are largest for employment, raw cotton delivered to mills, industrial 
production and GDP. This indicates that these four series are most sensitive to the 
“business cycle”.  If The Economist’s own preferred measure of economic activity, 
the Aggregate Index, were the only variable affected by the latent cyclical trend ,t mμ  
we should expect it to be the only series with a significant factor loading.  
 
Table A1 shows that ,t mμ  explains a statistically significant amount of the variation in 
the majority of The Economist’s 15 series, as well as, importantly, monthly GDP 
itself. Although our interest is with monthly GDP, rather than the “business cycle”, it 
is perhaps of interest that ,t mμ does not explain a statistically significant amount of the 
variation in the Aggregate Index. This suggests that the best statistical characterisation 
of the “business cycle” is not offered, as Rhodes suspected, by The Economist’s 
preferred measure – the Aggregate Index.  
 
Inspection of the AR coefficients in Table A1 reveals that the common 
factor ,t mμ follows an autoregressive process with a positive coefficient, with the 
coefficients that determine the idiosyncratic components exhibiting some 
heterogeneity across the different indicators. We could not accept, via a Likelihood 
Ratio test, the restriction that the idiosyncratic components shared a common AR 
coefficient. The majority of the parameters are statistically significant and the model 
shows good overall fit. 
 
Table A2 presents some model diagnostics based on the Kalman filter innovations 
from model (1). It shows that the model appears to be reasonably well specified, with 
the majority of the equations (for the different series) delivering innovations free from 
serial correlation and non-normality.  The failure of the normality test for 
employment, motors, the Aggregate Index and industrial production is explained by 
excess kurtosis (fat tails) which could not be eliminated by setting selected outlying 
observations to missing values. Importantly, the equation for GDP appears to be 
reasonably well specified.  
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Table A1: Parameter estimates and their asymptotic t-values 
 
 Factor 
loadings 
(x100) 
Autoregressive 
 Coeff t-value Coeff t-value 
Employment 1.27 12.65 -0.20 -2.62 
Coal Consumption 0.96 7.40 0.79 3.96 
Electricity Consumption 0.52 0.83 -0.37 -4.86 
Railways 0.51 2.28 -0.50 -6.87 
Motor 3.00 6.31 -0.39 -5.59 
Postal Receipts 0.02 0.34 -0.22 -3.01 
Building activity  0.19 1.75 -0.40 -5.83 
Iron and Steel for Home consumption 0.17 1.25 0.27 3.77 
Raw Cotton delivered to Mills 21.26 12.83 0.31 3.04 
Imports: Raw Materials  2.37 3.99 -0.36 -5.12 
Exports British 1.36 1.99 -0.35 -4.99 
Shipping Movements 0.81 2.01 -0.42 -6.11 
Banking clearings 1.78 8.28 -0.46 -6.66 
Banking town 0.40 3.39 -0.52 -7.82 
Aggregate Index 0.56 1.30 -0.39 -5.59 
Monthly Industrial Production: 2 ,t my  2.59 12.97 -0.10 -1.17 
Monthly GDP: 3 ,t my  5.62 17.01 -0.98 -77.38 
φ  (AR coefficient for the “business cycle”) - - 0.29 3.75 
 
 
Table A2: Diagnostic tests. The Box-Ljung test for no residual serial correlation with 
a maximum of 8 lags and the Bowman-Shenton test for normality  
 
 Box-
Ljung 
Bowman-
Shenton 
Employment 4.61 71.08 
Coal Consumption 13.07 1.41 
Electricity Consumption 9.47 0.11 
Railways 6.75 0.22 
Motor 5.96 43.41 
Postal Receipts 10.65 0.35 
Building activity 12.11 1.50 
Iron and Steel for Home consumption 3.45 0.08 
Raw Cotton delivered to Mills 5.70 0.50 
Imports: Raw Materials 10.54 2.28 
Exports British 25.33 4.11 
Shipping Movements 11.04 0.21 
Banking clearings 12.91 1.17 
Banking town 12.08 4.34 
Aggregate Index 25.96 31.45 
Monthly Industrial Production: 2 ,t my  19.83 58.10 
Monthly GDP: 3 ,t my  5.24 6.75 
   
99% critical value 17.54 7.38 
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